We shall conclude by suggesting ways in which Durkheim's answer is particularly relevant to our time.
Enforcement of Morals
and his own Law, Liberty and Morality (Hart 1963 ). The debate centered on the issue of whether homosexual acts between consenting adults in private should cease to be a crime (as recommended by the Wolfenden Report in 1957; a recommendation subsequently enacted into legislation). In his article, Hart takes up what he calls the disintegration thesis which he sees as forming a central part of Devlin's case justifying the legal enforcement of morality. The thesis essentially is that there is 'disintegration when no common morality is observed and history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegration.' (Devlin 1965: 13) Devlin's view was that 'the suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of subversive activities.' ( Hart 1963: 16) This implies that it is appropriate to criminalize conduct considered 'immoral' even if such conduct does not directly harm anybody (i.e. it is a so-called 'harmless' wrong).
In the latter part of his article Hart discusses what he takes to be Durkheim's version of this thesis because Durkheim's variant of it is 'relatively clear and briefly expressed, and is also specifically connected with the topic of the enforcement of morality by the criminal law.' (Hart 1967:5) Hart offers what he calls a 'thumbnail sketch of Durkheim's theory' which 'presents its essentials.' (7) Hart's sketch summarizes the differences between mechanical and organic solidarity and Durkheim's argument for punishment as 'a passionate reaction of graduated intensity to offences against the collective conscience.' (7) He then notes two complexities. First, Hart observes, Durkheim allows for change in the following way: his theory does not mean that it is necessary to conserve a penal rule because it once corresponded to the collective sentiments, but only if the sentiment is still 'living and energetic.' If it has disappeared or enfeebled, nothing is worse than to keep it artificially alive by the law.
Thus 'we must,' says Hart, be able to distinguish 'natural or nonmalignant change in social morality' from 'a malignant form of change from which society is to be protected.' And secondly, he stresses that (unlike Devlin) Durkheim sees punishment as sustaining the common morality, not mainly by repressing the immoral conduct, but principally by giving satisfactory vent to a sense of outrage because if the vent were closed the common conscience would 'lose its energy' and the cohesive morality would weaken. (7) (8) In order to understand why Hart invokes the disintegration thesis and Durkheim in the debate we need to understand his overall scheme of argumentation. Devlin appears to argue that sexually permissive behavior, even when entirely private conduct, will contribute to social disintegration by attacking the cohesive morality. His opponent Hart seeks to establish that instead of contributing to social disintegration such permissiveness might make it easier for men to submit to restraints on violence which are essential for social life. Devlin, however, was rightly understood by Hart to claim that morality is a seamless web: he evidently thought that 'with permissiveness in the area formally covered by restrictive sexual morality, there would come increases in violence and dishonesty and a general lapse of those restraints which are essential for any form of social life.' (13) If, 'common morality' gives way to moral pluralism once covered by a sexual morality which has decayed through the flouting of its restrictions, the thesis to be tested would presumably be that where moral pluralism develops in this way quarrels over the differences generated by divergent moralities must eventually destroy the minimal forms of restraints necessary for social cohesion.
To this Hart offers the counter-thesis that plural moralities in the conditions of modern large scale societies might perfectly well be mutually tolerant. To many indeed it might seem the more cogent of the two, and that over wide areas of modern life, sometimes hiding behind lip-service to an older common morality, there actually are divergent moralities living in peace. (13) The disintegration thesis derives from a conception of a moral core which cements society but itself changes over time. Once the core is not regulated by law, society may disintegrate (or in a softer version, lapse into disorder). Hart attacks Devlin by first questioning whether the disintegration thesis can be rendered empirically testable. He asks Devlin to either provide empirical evidence for the disintegration thesis or admit that the claim that a common morality is necessary for the continued existence of society is a disguised tautology relying on a definitional truth, i.e., identifying society with its shared morality. In his article Hart goes on to argue that if it is not an empirical claim (which to be plausible must be supported by evidence), then the disintegration thesis simply collapses into either of two other theses. One is the classical thesis, found in Plato and
Aristotle, that the law be used to punish vice and promote moral virtue, where these are given by a uniquely true or correct set of principles, accessed through reason or revelation. The other is the conservative thesis that 'society has a right to enforce its morality by law because the majority have a right to follow their own moral convictions that their moral environment is a thing of value to be defended from change.' (4) If, Hart argues, the disintegration thesis is indeed to be an empirical one, then, first, we need to be more precise about which parts of a society's moral code (assuming-a large assumption that Durkheim never questioned-that it has one overall moral code) are essential for the existence of a society and which are not. He offers two suggestions:
either 'those restraints and prohibitions that are essential to the existence of any society of human beings whatever;' or, for any given society, the 'central core of rules or principles which constitute' its 'pervasive and distinctive style of life.' (9-10) He finds the first view in neither Devlin nor Durkheim, who are both of them concerned with moral rules that vary from society to society. And he finds traces of the second view in Devlin but not in Durkheim.
Finally, he offers some thoughts about what would be needed to make this second idea empirically testable. You would, of course, need criteria to establish the existence of a single recognized morality and its central core. You would also need an empirically testable account of what would constitute disintegration. And then Hart makes two further suggestions. First, that we could 'examine societies which have disintegrated and enquire whether their disintegration was preceded by a malignant change in their common morality.' (11) Apart from the massive difficulties of establishing the causal connections in question and establishing the relevant macroscopic generalizations across cases, he makes the acute observation that in Durkheim's case there is the specific difficulty of generalizing from 'simpler' to modern industrial societies and, in particular the question of ' whether he means that in advanced societies characterized by the division of labor the mechanical solidarity which would still be reflected in its criminal law could be disregarded or not. ' (12) Most interesting of all, he concludes with his second suggestion: that we could look for social-psychological evidence that would flow from two alternatives to the maintenance of a common morality. The first alternative is permissiveness in the area previously covered by the common morality. The second alternative to the maintenance of a common morality is moral pluralism, involving divergent sub-moralities in relation to the same area of conduct.
In sum, Hart's conclusion is one of skepticism with regard to the disintegration thesis.
His focus, in the context of the Hart-Devlin debate, is on sexual, and more specifically still, homosexual morals, and he straightforwardly embraces the counter-thesis that permissiveness and moral pluralism in this domain are likely to be compatible with social integration.
Durkheim on Law and Morality
Hart's sketch of the disintegration thesis and how Durkheim fits into it is, in essence, a caricature of Durkheim's work on law and morality. But the question is whether it is a good or successful caricature-a successful caricature being indeed a simplified representation that captures, through exaggeration, the essentials of what it represents. It is our contention that far from being a good representation, Hart's version is a distortion and mis-application of Durkheim's views on the legal regulation of morality.
What Durkheim had to say about law and morality and the role of law in enforcing morality is, in the first place, more complex and more interesting than the simplistic version presented by Hart. Secondly, as we shall argue, it is misleading to characterize Durkheim as an 'integrationist,' in Hart's sense: that is, as one who claims that without the legal enforcement of the morals prevailing in society, social integration is weakened and will eventually collapse. In his search for a clear account of the disintegration thesis, Hart misleadingly selected only a few of Durkheim's early writings and, moreover, did so out of the context of his entire work. We will first outline Durkheim's views on morality and law before assessing these in the light of Hart's account and observations. Morality was for Durkheim, as Davy remarked, 'the center and end of his work. ' (Davy 1924: 71) His conception of the moral domain was extremely broad: it ranges from the fundamental to the apparently trivial and, employing the French word moeurs, invokes no distinction between morality and custom 1 . All moral rules, as Cotterell writes, 'in one way or another, are constraining social facts. All have sociological significance as sanctioned rules of conduct.' (Cotterell 1999: 60) . Law is an important part of the empirical project for studying morality. Durkheim is aware that studying legal rules gives an insight only into certain aspects of morality but he chooses to study laws as these are empirically most visible. While legal rules constitute a subset of moral rules: law and morality are too intimately related to be radically separated.
1 This is true of Durkheim's writings about morality until the very end, when he did draw this distinction in the draft of the introduction to the book he proposed to write on La Morale. He envisaged this proposed work as recasting anew his work on morality. He was working on the introduction on his deathbed and one of the drafts contains the following passage: Le mot de moeurs indiquant, dans notre pensée, la morale qui est effectivement observée par les hommes à chaque moment de l'histoire, celle qui a pour elle l'autorité de la tradition, par opposition à celle que le moraliste conçoit comme la morale de l'avenir. Mais l'expression n'est pas sans ambiguité et, en fait, a donné lieu à des équivoques. Sans doute, la morale du temps se retrouve dans les moeurs, mais dégradée, mise à la portée de la médiocrité humaine. Ce qu'ils traduisent, c'est la façon dont l'homme moyen applique les règles de la morale, et il ne les applique jamais sans compromission ni reticence. Les mobiles auxquels il obéit sont mêlés : il en est de nobles et de purs, mais il en est aussi de vulgaires et de bas. Au contraire, la science dont nous esquissons le plan, se propose d'atteindre les preceptes moraux, dans leur pureté et leur impersonalité. Elle a pour objet la morale elle-même, la morale ideale, planant au-dessus des actes humains, non les deformations qu'elle subit en s'incarnant dans les pratiques courantes qui ne peuvent la traduire qu 'imparfaitement. (1920/1975: 330 ). Durkheim's notion here of 'la morale elle-même, la morale idéale, planant au-dessus des actes humains' is meant to draw the distinction between social ideals and social practices that fail to live up to them-a distinction important, as we shall see below, for his account of the 'religion of individualism. ' The law and morality are not distinct domains. Legal rules are not distinguished from moral rules by their character: for example by their content or form or by the nature of the behavior they regulate, but rather by the way that the sanctions are administered.
Moral sanctions are diffuse -'administered by everybody without distinction.' Legal sanctions are, by contrast, organized-'applied only through the medium of a definite body,' 'specially authorized representatives' charged with the task of enforcement.' (Cotterell 1999: 60) Law involves some institutionalized means for publicly declaring and enforcing norms. The organization and institutionalization of law renders it highly visible. Law "is nothing more than the most stable and precise element in this very organization….Thus we may be sure to find reflected in the law all the essential varieties of social solidarity." Durkheim seeks ways to operationalize "social solidarity". He says "….we must therefore substitute for this internal datum, which escapes us, an external one which symbolizes it and then study the former through the latter. That visible symbol is the law." (Durkheim 1902 (Durkheim /1984 .
In his search for the most visible external indicators of morality Durkheim focused on the law's targeted effects evoked when laws are violated, namely sanctions. Distinguishing two broad types of sanction, he developed his idea of successive types of solidaritymechanical and organic-sustained and revealed by distinctive types of law, namely:
repressive law, focusing on punishing the offender, and restitutory law, focusing not on the infliction of suffering but rather on restoring the status quo ante, making the victim 'whole' again, as in contract law, administrative law and civil law generally. This was presented in The Division of Labor as the thesis that law is an index of the two kinds of solidarity, repressive law indicating the extent of mechanical solidarity and restitutory law the extent of organic solidarity. Hart, in passing, criticizes this idea, which we can call the index thesis, as somewhat fantastic, since it 'opens formidable problems concerning the individuation and countability of legal rules.' (Hart 1967: 6) Moreover, as
Cotterell writes, Legal provisions may be more or less detailed depending on the intentions or skill of the law creator, the extent to which common understandings governing circumstances in which the law is to apply can be assumed, and prevailing attitudes to interpretation of law. He fails to note that repressive and restitutive sanctions may often be mixed and that their relation to particular rules may be indirect and complex. In short, the index thesis, as he explains it, seems to show the worst aspects of the positivist orientations of his sociology. (Cotterell 1999: 33) Since we agree with Hart and Cotterell, we will not pursue the discussion of the index thesis any further. Similarly, we shall leave aside discussion of the coherence and plausibility of this way of conceiving of legal and social evolution. It involved making the awkward claim that 'rules where sanctions are restitutory either constitute no part at all of the collective consciousness, or subsist in it in only a weak state. Repressive law corresponds to what is the heart and centre of the common consciousness.' (Durkheim 1902 (Durkheim /1984 . It was to the latter that Durkheim turned his attention, while continuing in his more mature works to develop an evolutionary understanding of law based on an underlying change of morality, although he no longer used the kind of strictly binary and oppositional terms he used before. The penal aspect of law becomes more humane over time and becomes a means of strengthening the conscience collective by protecting the sanctity of the Individual. Later Durkheim refined this theory further by rejecting a rigid evolutionary trajectory for the change in nature of laws. But his work on the sanctity of the Individual suggests that he continued to think that a given society's law sustains and reveals its morality-that 'reflected in the law' are 'all the essential varieties of social solidarity' (Durkheim 1902 (Durkheim /1984 and, in particular, that modern law comes to enshrine a progressive idea of individualism.
Three ideas are fundamental to Durkheim's conception of morality. The first is that moral behavior is disinterested: that it is motivated by concerns other than an individual's selfinterest. Morality, he wrote, 'begins at the same point at which disinterestedness and devotion also begin.' (Durkheim 1924 (Durkheim /1974 The second is that moral disinterestedness always has a social origin: that we think and act morally in ways shaped by 'society.' Thus 'disinterestedness becomes meaningful only when its object has a higher moral value than we have as individuals. In the world of experience I know of only one being that possesses a richer and more complex reality than our own, and that is the collective being'. (Durkheim 1924 (Durkheim /1974 . And the third is that that origin-what counts as the collectivity or 'society'-is a moving target. It is never precisely identified: its scope can vary from the narrow circle of the nuclear family to the all-encompassing wider society of the nation state. He never doubted that, although our moral life has multiple sources, the latter was the main shaping source of modern morality. He also assumed that it was unitary, issuing in a single and unifying moral system or code for any given such society, though he speculated that it (and in particular the French moral code) incorporated elements of an emergent trans-national and incipiently universal morality. Now, given this conception of morality, his account of organic solidarity in The Division of Labor posed a serious problem. For, according to that account, as the shared beliefs, understandings and sentiments of the conscience commune recede, life, as Cotterell puts it, is 'varied and the role and positions that people occupy become increasingly specialized or distinct' so that 'the dominant form of solidarity in complex societies….arises through the effective integration of different social groups, reflecting different life experiences and values. ' (Cotterell 1999: 28) . The principal mechanism for achieving this integration, or co-ordination, is through contracts between individuals or collectivities, between workers and employers, professionals and their clients, between companies and generally between sellers and buyers of goods and services, each pursuing their respective interests. But this account of organic solidarity as interdependence of functions is purely instrumental: it lacks a moral dimension-in Durkheim's sense of 'moral' (hence his acknowledgement that the rules that regulate it 'do not form part of the common consciousness'). Contracts create and maintain reciprocal obligations between interested parties; but they leave no place for disinterestedness. They do not render the contracting partners any less interest-driven. Consider, for example, the labor contract. In
The Division of Labor (Durkheim 1902 (Durkheim /1984 ) organic solidarity, when functioning 'normally', is supposed to render capital-labor relations more just. There is, however, he writes in the chapter on 'The Forced Division of Labor', pervasive inequality and exploitation and thus 'unjust contracts' in advanced industrial societies. Where, then, does the impulse towards greater justice come from? His difficulty in answering this is what led him from 1895 onwards to revise his view of the shrinking conscience collective and to turn his attention to the changing content and character of shared beliefs and sentiments-he now used the terminology of représentations collectives-and thus to the distinctive nature of the evolving morality of modern industrial societies. This posits an evolution realizing progressive moral principles.
The Religion of Individualism
The key text for examining this is his remarkable article 'Individualism and the Intellectuals.' Alongside this article, Durkheim also published at this time two much shorter pieces, on anti-semitism and militarism, that supplement its concern: namely, how to restore social solidarity in a fractured modern society
In 'Individualism and the Intellectuals' (Durkheim 1898 (Durkheim /1973 ) Durkheim addresses the anti-Dreyfusard attack on intellectuals who 'obstinately refuse to bend their logic before the word of an army general' in the name of 'individualism.' To Ferdinand Brunetière's argument that the unity, indeed the very survival, of the French nation, was being threatened by their campaign for one individual's rights, Durkheim countered that it was individualism that was 'henceforth the only system of beliefs which could ensure the moral unity of the country.' (Durkheim 1898 (Durkheim /1973 ). Durkheim's article is highoctane, written in the heat of political battle, but it articulates very clearly the thinking about law and morality in modern societies that pervades his post-1895 writings. Its argument can be briefly summarized.
Modern industrial society, Durkheim argued, like all societies, needs a religion, in the sense of 'a system of collective beliefs and practices that have special authority.' Individualism is such a religion, deriving from Christianity, in which the human person becomes its sacred focus: it has 'penetrated our institutions and our customs' and become 'part of our whole life' (47), so that it was the anti-Dreyfusards who, by attacking it, were threatening the nation with moral anarchy.
Durkheim drew a sharp contrast between 'the narrow utilitarianism and utilitarian egoism of Spencer and the economists' reducing 'society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of production and exchange' and the individualism he was seeking to describe. This was the individualism of 'Kant and Rousseau, that of the spiritualists, that which the Declaration of the Rights of Man, sought, more or less successfully, to translate into formulae, that which is currently taught in our schools and which has become the basis of our moral catechism.' (45) It is egalitarian, since 'the only ways of acting that are moral are those which are fitting for all men equally, that is to say, which are implied in the notion of man in general.' 2 It was not 'the glorification of the self but of the individual in general.' Thus this human person (personne humaine), the definition of which is like the touchstone, which distinguishes good from evil, is considered sacred in the ritual sense of the word. It partakes of the transcendent majesty that churches of all time lend to their gods; it is conceived of as being invested with that mysterious property which creates a void about sacred things, which removes them from vulgar contacts and withdraws them from common circulation. And the respect which is given it comes precisely from this source. Whoever makes an attempt on a man's life, on a man's liberty, on a man's honor, inspires in us a feeling of horror analogous in every way to that which the believer experiences when he sees his idol profaned. Such an ethic is therefore not simply a hygienic discipline or a prudent economy of existence; it is a religion in which man is at once the worshipper and the god. (46) Individualism thus understood has as its motive force 'not egoism but sympathy for all that is human, a wider pity for all sufferings, for all human miseries, a more ardent desire to combat and alleviate them, a greater thirst for justice.' It is 'cult of man' that has 'for its first dogma the autonomy of reason' and for its first rite 'freedom of thought.' It is,, moreover, henceforth the only system of beliefs which can ensure the moral unity of the country. For with ever-greater social complexity and diversity, traditions and practices adapt to social change by become ever more plastic and unstable: social and cultural differentiation has developed almost to a point at which the members of a single society retain only their humanity in common. Society was evolving, he wrote, towards a state in which 'the members of a single group will have nothing in common among themselves except their humanity, except the constitutive attributes of the human person in general.'
Thus the 'idea of the human person,' given different emphases in accordance with the diversity of national temperaments, is 'the only idea which would be retained, unalterable but it could strengthen and reinvigorate public revulsion against such incitement.
In Suicide (first published in 1897) Durkheim offers a similar reason for why legal and other kinds of intervention are required in order to prevent suicides: the human personthe individual in general-is sacred and has to be preserved. Durkheim connects suicide to the conceptual structure of morality. He observes that by 'calling the evil of which the abnormal increase in suicides symptomatic of a moral evil, we are far from thinking to reduce it to some superficial ill which may be conjured away by soft words.' (Durkheim 1897 (Durkheim /1951 . He distinguishes a greater harm to society from the smaller harm to the individual. Thus,
A man who kills himself, the saying goes, does wrong only to himself and there is no occasion for the intervention of society; for so goes the ancient maxim Volenti non fit injuria. This is an error. Society is injured because the sentiment is is regulated is that 'Suicide is thought immoral in and for itself, whoever they may be who participate in it. Thus, with the progress of history, the prohibition, instead of being relaxed, only becomes more strict."(333). Earlier a person who commits suicide was viewed as an 'unscrupulous debtor to society.' Now the act of suicide is treated as a graver offence because today he has acquired a kind of dignity which places him above himself as well as above society. So long as his conduct has not caused him to forfeit the title of man, he seems to us to share in some degree in that quality sui generis ascribed by every religion to its gods which renders them inviolable by everything moral. He has become tinged with religious value; man has become a god for men.
Therefore any attempt against his life suggests sacrilege. Suicide is such an attempt. No matter who strikes the blow, it causes scandal by violation of the sacrosanct quality within us which we must respect in ourselves as well as in others. Hence, suicide is rebuked for derogating from this cult of human personality on which all our morality rests." (334).
It is this cult of the Individual which is a feature of modern morality and which Durkheim considers needs protection. In the case of suicide, such protection is afforded not just by laws, but also by religious traditions and popular sentiment. But Durkheim sees such protection taking multiple forms in various contexts. In the economic and industrial sphere, he so regarded policies favoring social justice and reducing exploitation. His conception of socialism was that it would alleviate 'the functioning of the social machine, still so harsh to individuals, to place within their reach all possible means of developing their abilities without hindrance, to work finally to make a reality of the famous precept:
"to each according to his labor".' (Durkheim 1924 (Durkheim /1974 And in the sphere of education he saw, and sought through his teaching to encourage, the development of what he called individualism, through moral education and enlightened pedagogy in the schools (see Durkheim 1925 Durkheim /1961 . In that discussion punishment-in the form of class discipline-reappears, but alongside a raft of other methods and practices. And it is relevant to note that Hart, to whose discussion we now return, limits his account of Durkheim's propounding of the disintegration thesis to his early writings on punishment. We shall come to these answers, but first we should note the gaps and weaknesses in Durkheim's argument as set out in 'Individualism and the Intellectuals' and elsewhere.
Durkheim and the Distintegration Thesis
For one thing, as already observed, that article is highly polemical and so we should discount phrases like 'putting national existence into jeopardy' and the like, and look for a more precise, less inflated account of what constitutes disintegration. Second, we should note the obvious inadequacies of Durkheim's account of the structure of modern industrial societies and, in particular, of the sources of the complexity and diversity that renders the so-called 'religion of individualism' the sole surviving common link.
Durkheim focuses entirely on the division of labor and occupational specialization and leaves it to us to fill in the rest of the picture-with ethnic, religious, regional and other cultural differences, the effects of intra and international migration, and many other factors. And third, the phrases 'religion of individualism' and 'cult of man' are more rhetorical than analytical, for, as Hans Joas has pointed out, This 'religion' lacks a cult in the sense of special rituals of a genuine church, a community of the faithful. This is not because this individualist ideal has no need of such practical and institutional supports. Durkheim himself had no real answer to the question of which institutions might undergird it…the democratic state and professional associations, revitalized on the model of the guilds…cannot be the last word on this.
We agree with Joas that 'his solution was overly abstract' and that we need 'to grapple far more concretely with existing religious and national traditions and historical experiences, if we wish to do justice to the interplay among state, civil society and values in the history of human rights' (Joas 2008a: 144) .
What, then, are the empirical claims that can be discerned in Durkheim's argument?
What did he think constitutes the 'moral core' of 'advanced societies' and how did he conceive (or, better, allow us to conceive) of 'social dissolution? We suggest that the answers to these two questions are interdependent: that the core moral norms are precisely those whose relaxation can weaken the protection of certain ways of acting and thinking. And we suggest that he answers the question: 'which ways are disintegrative, or malignant?' by drawing on his evolutionary conception of the progressive humanization of the 'institutions and customs' of our societies as they have become 'more advanced.'
Durkheim worked out this conception in his 'Two Laws of Penal Evolution' (Durkheim 1901 (Durkheim /1983 Specifically, he argued in 'Two Laws of Penal Evolution' that the criminal law displayed a long-run tendency for 'punishments to become milder as one goes from less to more advanced societies,' not because collective sentiments recede but because 'the sentiments protecting human dignity' are themselves at work in alleviating the harshness of punishments. They 'drive us to punish and to moderate the punishment,' for there is a real and irremediable contradiction in avenging the human dignity offended in the person of the victim by violating it in the person of the criminal. The only way, not of removing the antinomy (for that is strictly insoluble), but of alleviating it, is to alleviate the punishment as much as possible. (Durkheim 1901 (Durkheim /1983 Durkheim is thus making two claims here: that there is a causal nexus linking (probabilistically) punishment and the functioning of humane norms; and that the dignityprotecting collective sentiments that explain and justify the norms alleviate the harshness of the punishments which in turn contribute to their continuing strength.
It is an ambitious set of claims. Clearly, for them to be convincing some further questions need to be addressed. First, there needs to be specification of the conditions-economic, social, political and so on-under which these relations hold. We need to know under what conditions we should expect to see a decline in the severity of punishment, on the one hand, and, on the other, when to expect a growth in the strength of 'these sentiments that centre on man, the human being,' promoting a 'means of fulfilling and developing human nature' as 'the supreme object of collective sensibility.' (Durkheim 1950 (Durkheim /1957 . Durkheim himself took a small step in answering the first of these questions, by suggesting in 'Two Laws' that political democracy is one such condition: according to the first law, the 'intensity' of punishment, or quantity of severe punishments, is greater 'insofar as the central power has an absolute character.' In other words, the 'hypercentralization' of political power and the lack of countervailing power 'regularly organized to moderate it,' render the decline of penal severity less likely. (In failing to exploit this insight, it has been argued, Durkheim missed the chance to develop an account of modern authoritarianism).
Secondly, and importantly, we clearly need a non-rhetorical account, relating to specific contexts, of when norms and laws are properly to be characterized as 'humane,' After all, referring back to the examples cited at the beginning of this article, people can, in the name of 'human dignity,' both attack and defend laws against prostitution, pornography, assisted suicide, euthanasia, stem cell research, gay marriage and also abortion and indeed homosexual practices. Indeed, the language of 'human rights' has become a common discourse available to all parties in politically controversial legal cases, so that, for example, both the opponents and the proponents of the wearing of the veil by Muslim women argue for their positions in terms of the women's human rights. These are indeed formidable difficulties to be addressed but they are not, we believe, insurmountable
Let us suppose these questions resolved. We can then ask: what, following Durkheim's, or let us say this durkheimian, argument, are the sorts of consequences which can flow from the deregulation or non-regulation of core humane norms? Recall that we can identify them as occupying the core by observing the consequences of their weakening.
We can agree with Hart that the weakening of regulation of such norms may consist generally in permitting their violation and sometimes in the ensuing development of a plurality, or co-existence, of norms that neglect their requirements or indeed contradict and violate them. This makes society potentially more vulnerable to disintegrative consequences.
Hart's suggestions offer a promising start in helping to identify the relevant disintegrative consequences: namely, 'increases in violence and dishonesty and a general lapse of those restraints which are essential for any form of social life' and the rise of 'quarrels over the differences between divergent moralities' that threaten to 'destroy the minimal forms of restraints necessary for social cohesion.' (Hart 1967: 13) We need, however, to weaken these suggestions, since the mere survival of social cohesion--the mere avoidance of total social breakdown--sets too low an empirical standard that too many situations will satisfy. We should speak instead of losing the protections for 'restraints essential for any form of humane social life' and 'the minimum restraints necessary for humane social cohesion', in the sense indicated in the previous paragraphs. What I had learned about the treatment of the detainees shamed me deeply.
The case of torture
Conscious that the world would be watching and judging the commissions, I
wanted to prove that someone in the U. Slavery is excluded; and human rights are proclaimed (if differently interpreted) as binding everywhere. Some principles-such as protecting minorities from majorities in a democracy, non-arbitrariness, fair procedure and the umbrella principle of the rule of law, have become part of the modern moral framework. These may be challenged in practice but hardly so in principle. Racism, too, despite its survival in countless forms in modern societies, is no longer publicly defensible.
It is striking that Durkheim's writings about individualism were penned at a time of heightened persecution of the Jewish minority in France. Both the essays on individualism and the intellectuals and on anti-Semitism contain practical suggestions on how to combat racial prejudice. Durkheim viewed anti-Semitism as a thermometer for measuring the pathology of society. He recognized that punishment for incitement was not going to change people's minds by itself, but he argued that it would strengthen and reinvigorate public revulsion for such behavior. Opponents of racism must condemn it in both theory and practice, and the government had to take responsibility for enlightening the masses. Durkheim viewed this moral education as a means of repairing social disorder.
These suggestions and call to action are, of course, applicable to other social prejudices than the racial and ethnic varieties. In particular, the anti-Semitism Durkheim combated is a prejudice in many ways analogous to the homophobia faced by minority gays in Britain in the 1950s. Certainly, the subsequent decriminalization of gay sex and the rendering illegal of discrimination in employment on grounds of sexual orientation fully bear out Hart's eloquently argued liberal case against Devlin, and, in particular, his claim that social solidarity would be compatible with permissiveness and pluralism. When Hart responded to Devlin's case for the legal enforcement of morals, the time had finally come in Britain to treat homosexuals as human persons rather than as a persecuted minority.
